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Abstract 
We reviewed fundamental conceptual issues and the state of research on the definition 
of and assessment of implicit theories. We grappled with the following controversies related 
to the construct: (a) Are entity theory and incremental theory opposite ends of the same 
continuum? (b) How can scholars use more sophisticated methodologies to classify 
individuals into either the entity or incremental theory? (c) Given shifting conceptions of 
what intelligence is, how can scholars refine the implicit theory of intelligence construct? 
Given these conceptual issues, we then addressed practical issues related to the assessment of 
implicit theories. We pointed to the need for more sophisticated methods such as implicit 
associations tests, and the use of virtual environments as more “stealthy” ways to assess the 
construct. 
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The first challenge for this topical issue of the Zeitschrift für Psychologie arose as we 
contemplated the appropriate term for our topic. Should the construct be called Implicit 
theories, the way Dweck and Leggett (1988) first introduced the term in their seminal article? 
Or should it be called mindsets, a term many have used? What about the more general term 
self-theories, or lay theories, or naive theories? This challenge of coming up with an 
appropriate term was exacerbated by the fact that the same authors would often use numerous 
terms interchangeably. How, then, should researchers describe these fundamental 
assumptions about human attributes, which individuals develop to explain and understand 
their world? The seminal paper of Carol Dweck and Ellen Leggett (1988) introduced implicit 
theories of intelligence and implicit theories of personality as conceptual terms, which are 
both still widely used in research. In the last decade, however, more and more publications 
started to use the term “mindset” instead of or interchangeably with implicit theories. But are 
implicit theories and mindsets describing the same theoretical concept? How are lay theories 
and naive theories related to implicit theories and mindsets? The precise nature and meaning 
of the terms implicit theory or mindset have not been explicitly discussed in the relevant 
literature so far. Precise definitions are largely missing and it seems that scholars assume that 
their readers share the same understanding of what is meant by implicit theories, mindsets, or 
other terms.  
Despite the proliferation of terms used to describe these personal theories of seeing 
and describing the world, one aspect of the concept has stayed constant. Regardless of the 
name, implicit theories (or their related terms) have always taken on two different forms.  
Dweck (1986) posited that people think of human attributes such as intelligence or social 
characteristics either as (1) immutable traits (i.e., people are born with a particular 
personality, which cannot be changed), or they view human attributes as malleable qualities 
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(i.e., people are able to continually improve their base capacity to do mathematics). Dweck 
and Leggett (1988) also argued that this belief about the malleability or fixedness of human 
attributes does not have to be limited only to self-beliefs. Rather, they can also encompass 
beliefs about other people, places, or phenomena. In addition, there has been debate about 
how context-specific these beliefs are--can one possess a fixed theory of personality, but an 
incremental theory of morality? A related challenge that we wrestled with as we 
conceptualized this special issue is the fact that definitional murkiness leads to challenges in 
measuring or assessing the construct. Are entity theory and incremental theory two unipolar 
constructs or two ends of a bipolar construct? How can entity versus incremental theorists 
clearly designated? The challenge of assessing this “messy” construct is made even more 
difficult by the fact that implicit theories are difficult to directly observe simply because they 
are just that--implicit! Therefore, definitional clarity is a sine qua non if we are to develop 
high quality assessments for the construct. 
Overview 
One purpose of this paper is to tidy up the messy wording/definition and measurement 
of implicit theories. Our hope is that by systematically reviewing the various ways scholars 
have defined and assessed the construct colleagues in the field can take one step closer 
toward definitional and conceptual clarity as well as create more valid and reliable ways to 
assess the construct. To be clear, our goal is not to come to one single authoritative definition 
of the construct, or to recommend the “best” way to assess it.  Rather, our goal is to bring to 
bare tensions in the literature in how the construct is defined, conceptualized and assessed, 
and also identify areas of overlap. 
“Same Same but Different” 
“Same same but different” is a common phrase used by native Thai speakers when 
referring to things that appear similar but are still meaningfully different. This famous 
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Tinglish phrase can also be applied to the wording issues related to the construct of implicit 
theories. In the academic literature one can find numerous terms describing the same thing--
implicit theories (e.g. Dweck & Leggett, 1988), implicit beliefs (e.g. Haselhuhn, Schweitzer, 
& Wood, 2010; Howell & Buro, 2009), worldviews (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a; 
Malmberg & Little, 2007), mindsets (Dweck, 2006), self-theories (Dweck, 2000), meaning 
systems (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999), lay theories (Molden & Dweck, 2006) and 
naive theories (Miele & Molden, 2010; Heider, 1958; Wegener & Petty, 1998). This 
incongruence in terminology is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to the 
pioneering work of Solomon Ash (1946), Lee Cronbach (1965; implicit theory of 
personality), and Fritz Heider (1958; common-sense psychology). Heider (1958) studied 
interpersonal relations using common-sense psychology, which he also called naive 
psychology or implicit theory. In a similar manner, Dweck and her colleagues have 
introduced and popularized different terms without explicitly defining or distinguishing 
among the terms. The first term Dweck and her colleagues used was implicit theories (Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988).  From there, self-theories and mindsets began gaining traction, and are now 
commonly used both in popular literature (e.g., Dweck, 2006) and in scholarly literature (e.g., 
Rattan, Savani, Chugh, & Dweck, 2015).  The terms most often used in empirical studies to 
describe the research in the tradition of Dweck seems to be implicit theories, lay theories, 
self-theories, and mindsets. The use of different names can be partly explained by 
psychological disciplines in which the research was done. Lay theories and naive theories are 
more used in social psychology (e.g. Wesnousky, Oettingen, & Gollwitzer, 2015) and 
experimental psychology (e.g.  Miele & Molden, 2010) whereas implicit theory and mindsets 
commonly used in educational (e.g. Bråten & Strømsø, 2004) and developmental psychology 
(e.g. Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). However, many empirical studies also 
consequently use more than one of the aforementioned terms without recognizing the 
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inconsistent labeling; this is also true for studies published more recently in high impact 
journals such as Psychological Bulletin (implicit theory and mindset, Burnette, O’Boyle, 
VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013) or Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (lay 
theory & mindset in Yeager, Walton, et al., 2016). Are researchers really talking about the 
same construct but using different labels (cf. Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & 
Harackiewicz, 2010 for an example in achievement goal theory)?  
We start with the original label of implicit theories, which can be defined as, “core 
assumptions about the malleability of personal attributes. They are called ‘implicit’ because 
they are rarely made explicit, and they are called ‘theories‘ because like a scientific theory, 
they create a framework for making for prediction and judging the meaning of events in one’s 
world.” (Yeager & Dweck, 2012, p. 303). Lay theories or naive theories can generally be 
described as common sense heuristics that people use to make sense of themselves and the 
world (Heider, 1958; Wegener & Petty, 1988). The term “theories” is one common aspect 
that the various terms share (naive theories, lay theories, self-theories), and describes a goal 
of holding an abstract understanding of the workings of the social world. A second common 
feature of these theories is that, unlike scientific theories, they tend to be intuitive and are 
formulated by lay people rather than experts in a field. A third common aspect is that people 
are not necessarily aware of their lay theories. They are rarely explicitly articulated in the 
mind of the person holding them. However, the term implicit can also cause confusion. In 
work on social cognition the term implicit is associated with the inability of people to report 
the existence or operation of some entity or past experience. But research exploring implicit 
theories of intelligence goes against this notion because people are often quite able to report 
their beliefs. For this reason, we agree with other scholars (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1988) who 
argue that lay or naive theories are in fact accessible to the person holding those beliefs. 
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Given the description of lay or naive theories, could the term mindset also be 
considered a type of lay or naive theory? The term mindset was introduced in the non-
academic book Mindset (Dweck, 2006) and has also been used in research publications ever 
since. Presently, from the perspective of scientific research a precise and meaningful 
definition of mindset is largely lacking. Turning to definitions from English dictionaries 
(Macmillian Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Online Etymology Dictionary, Oxford 
Learner's Dictionary) a mindset can be described as a particular way of thinking, a person’s 
attitude or set of attitudes/opinions/ideas about something. A mindset may also be connected 
with some sort of stability or fixedness but this was not a common aspect of the different 
non-scientific definitions we observed. These definitions do not contain the three common 
aspects (theory, intuitive, unaware) that lay, naive, and implicit theories share. For these 
reasons, we believe that using the term mindset has a clear purpose for the scientific 
community to easily bridge the gap between the theoretical world of academic scientists on 
the one hand, and widespread practice among the general public on the other.  We 
acknowledge how important it is for academic knowledge to make a positive impact on 
society. After all, as Schober, Brandt, Kollmayer, and Spiel (2016) noted, this is the third 
mission of science.  That is, universities and academics should use the results produced by 
their first mission (teaching) and second mission (research) to address growing social, 
economic, and societal challenges. However, for rigorous research, where clear specification 
of terms is essential in correctly operationalizing the construct of interest, the use of the term 
mindset seems to do more harm than good.  
Instead of using the word mindset in academic research, we suggest using the terms 
incremental and entity theory (Dweck, 1986), which clearly refer to the research on the 
malleability of human attributes. On a higher level it seems justified based on enough 
conceptual overlap to treat them as specific types of lay theories, naive theories, or implicit 
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theories. However, from our perspective it seems desirable to avoid using different names for 
the same construct.  Instead, we should come to some consensus about a standard way to 
name the construct. Our suggestion is just to use the term implicit theory because it captures 
all aspects of the construct and is by far the most commonly used term, and the one with 
which Dweck and her colleagues started. 
Can People Hold More Than one Theory? 
Another question we faced regarding implicit theories is the question of whether 
people can simultaneously hold both an incremental and an entity theory in the same domain 
(e.g., achievement; see Anderson, 1995; Schunk, 1995). Most conceptual papers and 
empirical studies have treated the two implicit theories as mutually exclusive beliefs. For 
example, Dweck et al. (1995b) argued that, “believing that something cannot be changed is 
the logical opposite of believing it can be changed” (p. 323). In fact, in all of their empirical 
work, Dweck and her colleagues have conceptualized incremental and entity beliefs as 
opposite ends of a single continuum (e.g. Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et al., 1995a). 
However, there were some critical comments about the appropriateness of a unidimensional 
conceptualization and the possibility of holding competing cognitions. Especially in 
achievement situations individuals could simultaneously entertain incremental and entity 
beliefs (Schunk, 1995). Anderson (1995) argued that it was possible that incremental and 
entity theories were simply knowledge structures, which were freely available for individuals 
to access. Whether people accessed one or the other depended on how the specific context 
made one belief more salient than the other. This could be quite possible given the seeming 
ease with which both theories can be experimentally manipulated (Dinger & Dickhäuser, 
2013). Although Dweck and colleagues (1995b) also recognized the possibility that people 
can hold both beliefs at the same time this did not lead to major changes in the 
operationalization of implicit theories in their empirical studies. In the vast majority of 
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empirical studies, instead of two unipolar constructs of implicit theories one bipolar construct 
is used (see the latest meta-analysis of Burnette et al., 2013; Tempelaar, Rienties, Giesbers, & 
Gijselaers, 2014). This is usually accomplished by reverse scoring the entity scale measure 
and combining it with the incremental scale score to calculate a mean implicit theory score. 
From a methodological point of view, such a consolidation would be only acceptable when 
the two unidimensional implicit theory scales prove to be strongly inversely related.  
Studies dealing with this issue are rare (e.g. Bråten, & Strømsø, 2004; Howell & Buro, 
2009; Malmberg & Little, 2007; Tempelaar et al., 2014). Findings show that bivariate 
correlations, when reported, vary widely (ranging from -.02 to -.78) but in general are too 
weak. Some studies using exploratory factor analysis have revealed two distinct factors (e.g. 
Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005). And confirmatory factor analyses have shown better model fit for 
a two-factor model compared to a single bipolar factor model (see Tempelaar et al., 2014). 
These findings suggest a much looser coupling of entity and incremental theories and raise 
doubts about whether they should be treated as a single bipolar construct in empirical 
research. Perhaps, as other scholars have done (e.g., Chen, 2012; Dai & Cromley, 2014; 
Tempelaar et al., 2014), both the entity theory and incremental theory construct should be 
modeled together--treating each as its own construct. 
Another common practice to measure implicit theories is just to include entity theory 
items (e.g. Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Lüftenegger et al., 2015; Pomerantz & 
Kempner, 2013; Yeager, Romero, et al., 2016) whereby disagreement with these statements 
reflects the endorsement of an incremental theory. This procedure is mainly chosen to avoid a 
possible bias because the incremental theory statements tend to be more compelling and the 
more socially desirable choice, and respondents tended to universally endorse them (Erdley, 
Loomis, Cain, Dumas-Hines, & Dweck, 1997; Pomerantz & Kempner, 2013). Hence, the 
inclusion of incremental theory statements has the potential to interfere with students’ 
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endorsement of entity theory statements. On the other hand, offering only entity theory items 
runs the risk of an acquiescence response bias, which results in an overestimation of an entity 
theory endorsement. 
There are also measures that are constructed to follow a strict bipolar 
conceptualization of implicit theories (e.g. Spinath & Schöne, 2003). They are, however, used 
less often (e.g. Dickhäuser, Dinger, Janke, Spinath, & Steinmayr, 2016; Lüftenegger, Tran, 
Bardach, Schober, & Spiel, in press). In this format, respondents complete statements by 
indicating, using a 6-point semantic differential, the degree to which a certain quality is 
malleable (sample item: “You have a certain amount of intelligence ‘that cannot be changed’ 
versus ‘that can be changed’ ’’). In this way, respondents can decide between entity and 
incremental theory on a continuum within one statement. Respondents disagreeing with entity 
statements are therefore given the opportunity to choose an incremental theory thus avoiding 
a possible acquiescence bias. 
From our perspective, there is enough evidence that challenges the traditional and still 
dominant conceptualization that incremental and entity theories appear to be each other’s 
opposite. In addition to theoretical considerations a number of empirical studies suggest that 
people can hold more than one implicit theory. However, because there are relatively few 
empirical studies, it is difficult to discern where the weight of the evidence falls.  For this 
reason, we recommend further empirical studies exploring, for example, whether modeling 
incremental and entity theories separately as their own unidimensional constructs has better 
predictive validity than modeling the incremental and entity theories as opposite ends of the 
same construct.  
Classification of Entity versus Incremental Theorists 
How do researchers decide whether to classify a participant as an entity theorist or an 
incremental theorist? Dweck and colleagues (1995a), for example, categorize respondents as 
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entity theorists if their overall implicit theory score is 3.0 or below (on a 6-point scale), and 
as incremental theorists if their overall score is 4.0 or above. The subjects in the middle, the 
mixed or neutral group, are normally excluded from former analysis (according to Dweck et 
al., 1995a, this group tend to be about 15% of a sample). An empirical strategy for the 
classification of the three groups (entity, incremental, mixed) is using 1 Standard Deviation 
above and below the theory of intelligence mean score (Blackwell et al., 2007). There are 
several critical issues associated with these classification strategies. First, from a theoretical 
perspective cutoffs suggest that a clear differentiation between different categories based on 
specific criteria is possible. However, as far as we know clear criteria that differentiate the 
different groups at a specific point are still missing as well as a clear definition of the mixed 
group. Additionally, the merit of a priori categorization of individuals into specific groups 
can be quite misleading (Peterson, 1995). Second, different frequencies of the three groups 
exist across samples and domains, and the use of a fixed cutoff criterion limits 
generalizability. Third, based on the criterion for exclusion the mixed group could be quite 
large. Tempelaar et al. (2014), for example, found 64% of the whole sample (n = 4594) 
belonging to the mixed group when using M ± 1SD as a classification criterion. The 
remaining 18.2% of entity theorists and 17.8% of incremental theorists would represent 
extreme groups and conclusions drawn by results of extreme group comparisons are strongly 
limited (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005).  
From a methodological perspective, dichotomizing the implicit theory construct has 
substantial negative consequences. Depending on design and analysis this can include loss of 
information about individual differences, loss or overestimation of effect size, loss of power, 
spurious statistical significance, or loss of measurement reliability (MacCallum, Zhang, 
Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). These consequences can be easily avoided by application of 
standard methods of regression or correlational analysis to the original (undichotomized) 
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measures. Another possible alternative to dichotomizing the construct is simply to model 
both constructs within a person-centered analytical approach (e.g., cluster analysis or latent 
profile analysis).  By doing this, scholars are able to create groups not by arbitrary cutoffs. 
Rather, the groups are formed by what the actual data reveal. Finally, if we recognize the 
possibility of endorsing both implicit theories simultaneously, then a strict dichotomization 
along with the exclusion of a mixed group becomes less defensible. From our perspective, 
there is no good reason for dichotomizing the implicit theory measure, nor is there a good 
reason to exclude the mixed group. 
Definition and Malleability of Intelligence 
As noted earlier, there is little empirical evidence suggesting that individuals’ belief 
about the malleability of intelligence is strongly inversely related to their belief in the 
fixedness of intelligence. A possible explanation may be that people have varying personal 
definitions of intelligence (Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005). Empirical evidence reveals that 
neither laypersons nor experts see intelligence as a unidimensional construct. This more 
nuanced (and Western cultural) conception of intelligence typically consists of three distinct 
dimensions: practical-problem solving (fluid ability), verbal ability (crystallized ability), and 
social competence (Sternberg, 1985). Sternberg also noted that experts include motivation as 
a fourth dimension of intelligence. Individuals use these implicit dimensions to form abstract 
characterizations and to evaluate their own intelligence, and that of others (Sternberg, 1985). 
Simply asking about the malleability of intelligence, therefore, is likely incongruent with 
most people’s multidimensional view of the construct. People might believe that verbal 
ability, for example, is a fixed trait, but simultaneously believe that social competence is 
malleable. This might especially be the case for adults because they are more likely to have 
had many opportunities developing competencies in different contexts over multiple phases 
of life (Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005).  
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Alternative Approaches for Assessing Implicit Theories 
Although incremental and entity theories are implicit in their nature they are 
traditionally observed using explicit measures. Implicit theory assessments across domains 
typically use a standard assessment adapted from the original measure of implicit theories of 
intelligence (Dweck, 2000). This assessment is a brief self-report questionnaire asking 
respondents to rate the degree to which they endorse entity or incremental statements from a 
given domain. Alternative assessments are largely missing, especially those that tap into 
implicit theories in an implicit fashion. Implicit measures such as priming or the implicit 
association test (IAT) provide information about the construct of interest without directly 
asking people for a verbal report (for an overview see Fazio & Olsen, 2003). The appeal is 
that the outcomes of implicit measures can more easily reduce the effects of social 
desirability. Furthermore, they avoid common shortcomings of self-reports such as the risk of 
acquiescence responding or that people report more than they actually know (flawed 
introspectionism; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). To the best of our knowledge only one study by 
Mascret and colleagues (2015) examined implicit theories using an implicit measure. They 
created a single-target IAT to measure if individuals adhered to an entity theory or 
incremental theory. Their findings are only partly in accordance with findings from explicit 
(self-report) measures.  
Studies using measures other than self-report are scarce. Behavioral measures to 
identify or investigate implicit theories are lacking. However, three neuroscience studies 
(Mangels et al., 2006; Moser et al., 2011; Schroder et al., 2014) provide a new perspective on 
the induction and consequences of implicit theories and give more insight in the neural 
mechanism of implicit theories. Clearly, exploring how implicit measures, behavioral 
measures, and a neuroscience perspective can complement and extend explicit self-reports is 
an area that is ripe for future research. 
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Virtual Reality 
 Another way to assess implicit theories could involve the use of computer 
technologies. The capabilities of computer technologies have grown exponentially since the 
first assessments of implicit theories were developed. This increased capacity allows 
researchers to capture and analyze a large variety of data from research participants engaging 
in authentic tasks. One of the downfalls of asking participants to respond to survey items is 
that it is difficult to get situationally specific beliefs while people are engaging in a difficult 
task. Survey responses that assess students’ implicit theories of intelligence capture what 
students believe about intelligence in general. However, as we have argued earlier, implicit 
theories might function as knowledge structures (see Anderson, 1995), which are freely 
accessible and are activated by certain cues presented within the environment. For example, 
students might be immersed in a virtual world in which they have to figure out how to source 
of an ecological problem, which would involve designing scientific experiments to test 
hypotheses, but could also require students to collaborate with other students effectively.  
Some students, for example, might believe that their ability to figure out the causes of the 
disaster are fixed, but that their ability to write a compelling argument to their colleagues 
detailing how they arrived at such a conclusion is augmentable. This type of domain specific 
assessment could be explored using virtual environments. 
This idea is not a new one. Researchers in science education, for example, have been 
developing assessments using immersive virtual environments (=IVEs) to assess students’ 
science inquiry skills (see Clark-Midura & Dede, 2010; Ketelhut et al., 2013; for a review see 
Nelson & Ketelhut, 2007). For example, Ketelhut et al. (2013) started with the premise that 
high quality assessments are inextricably linked to learning. In the context of science 
learning, Ketelhut et al. argued that, “it is impossible to assess [the deeper understanding of 
what scientists do] without embedding its assessment in content” (p. 176). The potential 
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power of IVEs is that they are able to immerse participants in a dynamic learning 
environment and create a physical and affective experience of “being there” (Dede, 2009) 
while interacting with actual academic content. Some empirical research has revealed that 
IVEs are effective when they build a cohesive and compelling narrative to engage students in 
a particular learning space (Barab, Sadler, Heiselt, Hickey, & Zuiker, 2007; Girard et al., 
2013; Rowe, Shores, Mott, & Lester, 2010). This affordance of IVEs allows social scientists 
to immerse participants in a learning context that feels quite real and natural, where they are 
enacting practices that are authentic to the learning context. By situating assessments within 
an appropriate learning context, assessment creators can increase the ecological validity of 
their assessments.   
Translating this approach from assessing scientific inquiry skills to assessing implicit 
theories is possible, but will require significant work if these approaches are to be reliable and 
valid. For example, researchers could design an environment in which students have to use an 
assortment of strategies to solve a series of problems that get progressively more difficult.  
Researchers could then observe whether students used those strategies in a systematic way, or 
if they just provided an answer and either moved on when getting it right or quit when they 
failed. According to Dweck and Leggett (1988), people holding a fixed theory might behave 
just like those holding an incremental theory of ability until they run into significant 
challenges. By observing what students do and say in the face of challenges, researchers can 
make inferences about students’ theories of ability. 
Of course, assessing implicit theories in this way requires researchers to be absolutely 
clear about what it actually means to hold a fixed or incremental theory of ability, and what 
specific things they do and say. For example, although Dweck and her colleagues have 
pointed to goal orientations, effort beliefs, use of strategies, and persistence in the face of 
failure as outcomes of implicit theories of ability, it is not yet clear how researchers would 
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assess students’ beliefs about the fixedness of ability rather than, for example, beliefs about 
effort. Other than giving up in the face of failure or refusing to use strategies, what specific 
things do students do or say to show that they think that their abilities are static versus 
malleable? In the earlier example of presenting students with progressively more difficult 
inquiry challenges, does giving up on a challenge mean that students think that they are not 
smart enough to figure it out, or does it instead mean that students felt that it was not worth 
their efforts to go through the trouble of engaging in those strategies? Those are two different 
constructs—the first is a fixed theory of ability, but the second is an example of students’ cost 
value beliefs. Creative design decisions will have to be implemented that assess students’ 
implicit theories of ability without bluntly asking them whether they think that their ability is 
static or augmentable. Thus, although assessments using virtual environments hold great 
promise in their ability to assess beliefs at a finer grain size couched within specific learning 
contexts, designing such assessments will take much work before they can be reliably and 
validly used. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Despite the rich literature base and long history of research on implicit theories, there 
still remain large gaps in the research base. By outlining the conceptual controversies in the 
current literature, we highlighted the fact that much theoretical work still needs to be done in 
examining whether the implicit theory construct is indeed multidimensional or 
unidimensional. We also highlighted the need to examine how ongoing changes in how both 
laypersons and experts view the concept of intelligence change the way in which we conceive 
of the concept of implicit theories of intelligence. Our review also highlighted large gaps in 
our understanding about practical issues such as how to assess implicit theories in much more 
sophisticated ways than what scholars have traditionally been able to do. Our hope is that this 
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special issue will encourage scholars from a wide range of disciplines to thoughtfully 
examine how they can operationalize and assess implicit theories.     
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